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Abstract
We employ a dynamic market model with endogenous creation of submarkets to
study the optimal product innovation strategies of incumbent firms. Firms invest
in production capacity and R&D knowledge stock, where the latter determines the
hazard rate of innovation. We find that under Markov Perfect Equilibrium behavior
the firm with a larger market share on the established market is less likely to be the
first innovator. Investment in R&D knowledge is negatively affected by the opponent’s
production capacity on the established market if the opponent has not innovated yet.
However, this effect is reversed after the opponent has successfully introduced the new
product. The firm with higher costs of adjusting capacity for the established product
has a larger incentive to engage in product innovation and might even achieve higher
long run profit than its more efficient competitor.
Key Words: product innovation strategy, capacity investment, dynamic competition,
Markov Perfect Equilibrium
1 Introduction
A considerable fraction of product innovations in related submarkets is accomplished by
established incumbents (e.g. Chandy and Tellis (2000), Sood and Tellis (2011), King
and Tucci (2002), Franco et al. (2009), Buensdorf (2016)). This paper contributes to
the strategy dynamics literature by investigating the influence of an incumbent’s strength
on an established market on the incentive to engage in product innovations for related
submarkets and on the timing of new product introduction. Anecdotal evidence seems
to suggest a particular pattern for this relationship: firms that possess a relatively high
share of the established market tend to enter newly emerging submarkets later than their
currently smaller opponents. To illustrate, in 2010 when Apple and Samsung introduced
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Tablet PCs and thus created a new submarket that coexisted with the established market
of portable computers, they had relatively small market shares on the Laptop market (3.4%
and 2.8% respectively) compared to Hewlett Packard and Dell (18% and 12% respectively).
Interestingly, HP and Dell entered the Tablet market much later in 2013.1 In the market
for smartphones, Nokia, as the clear market leader in the early 2000s (market share 2005:
32.5%), introduced its first touchscreen phone in 2011, while its initially smaller competitor
Samsung (market share 2005: 12.7%) introduced its first smartphone with a touchscreen
in 2008. As a result, Samsung achieved a higher market share in 2012 and also exhibited
strongly positive dynamics of profit in the smartphone market compared to Nokia.
The managerial and strategy literature extensively discusses the reasons for the ob-
served pattern that big incumbents are often slower than smaller rivals (or entrants) in
pioneering newly created submarkets. There are at least four approaches that can be
distinguished and they share the view that the relatively slow adoption of innovation by
big incumbents leads to suboptimal outcomes from a long term firm perspective. First,
incumbents underinvest in the development of new technologies or products due to the fear
of cannibalizing its existing business. In line with this view, it has been argued, e.g. in
Nault and Vandenbosch (1996), that incumbent firms have to ’eat their own lunches before
somebody else does’. In particular, this literature suggests that a market leader’s optimal
strategy is to aggressively cannibalize its own current advantages by next-generation in-
novations before competitors step in to steal the market.
Second, large firms might lack the potential of small firms to motivate their engineering
staff. The associated bureaucracy and incentive effects lead to lower innovation intensity
(e.g. Zenger (1994)). Third, big incumbent firms might rely on a dominant managerial
logic, organizational capabilities and cognitive frames that lead these firms – sometimes
even after large sums of investments – to miss new opportunities (e.g. Christensen (1997),
Henderson (1993, 2006), Tripsas (1997), Tripsas and Gavetti (2000)). Fourth and fi-
nally, incumbent firms are less successful in innovation since there are diseconomies of
scope which arise from key assets that have to be shared across businesses (Bresnahan et
al. (2012)). In contrast to these explanations that focus on the suboptimality of firms’
decisions, our paper shows that the strategy of large incumbents to enter a new market
relatively late follows from intertemporally optimal behavior of all firms in the market. In
a multi-product setting in which the original market continues to attract consumers even
after the new submarket has been created, the decision of the dominant incumbent firm
to get leapfrogged by a smaller rival that enters the new submarket earlier, simply results
from pursuing long run profit maximization. The conclusion is that leader firms might
prefer not to maintain leadership due to their involvement in existing market segments
(see also Pacheco-de-Almeida (2010), Swinney et al. (2011)).
More precisely, the main contribution of our paper is to characterize the intertempo-
rally optimal innovation behavior of incumbent firms in an industry with evolving market
structure. In such an industry, a submarket is created endogenously by an incumbent’s
product innovation. In accordance with the dynamic pattern described above, our study
leads to the conclusion that the expected innovation time of large incumbents is larger
than the innovation time of its smaller competitors. The main driving force of this find-
ing is that an incumbent’s resource commitment on the established market (in terms of
production capacity) has a negative impact on the incumbent’s incentive to investment in
firm-specific resources that are key for product innovation. In particular, we argue that a
firm’s incentive to invest is determined by a size effect and a pure knowledge effect, apart
from the well-known cannibalization effect. Considering a scenario of initial resource het-
1HP made a short - but unsuccessful - premature attempt of offering a Tablet PC in 2010.
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erogeneity, e.g. where the incumbents differ with respect to their technology of building up
resources for production on the established market, the interaction of these effects implies
that the firm with a cost disadvantage on the established market invests more in building
up key resources for product innovation and, therefore, expects to innovate faster. In such
a situation, it might turn out that a cost-disadvantaged incumbent on the established
market can actually have a higher value function (expected discounted profits) than its
more cost-efficient opponent. In other words, despite having a competitive disadvantage
(at a point in time), an incumbent firm can have superior performance (in the long run).
Intuitively, in equilibrium the cost disadvantage acts as a strategic commitment device of
the firm to make large investments in firm-specific resources for innovation, which in turn
causes reduced innovation activities by its competitor.
Additionally, our analysis generates new managerial insights about the qualitative
properties of the firms’ optimal strategies for investing in and developing resources for
product innovations. Analyzing a dynamic industry model enables us to highlight quali-
tative differences between the optimal strategy for building up key resources for product
innovation in a phase where competition only occurs on the established market and a phase
after a competitor has created a new submarket by its product innovation. We find that
innovation activity is negatively affected by the opponent’s production capacity on the
established market if the opponent has not innovated yet. However, this effect is reversed
after the opponent has successfully innovated. Furthermore, the optimal level of a firm’s
investment in firm-specific R&D resources exhibits a downward jump at the time when the
opponent creates the new submarket, since the discounted profit stream generated by the
firm’s product innovation drops once the competitor is active on the new market. After
this discontinuous change in the firm’s investment level, the optimal investment pattern
exhibits a steady adjustment. This pattern might be increasing or decreasing over time,
however it always stays below the investment level prior to the opponent’s innovation.
An important managerial implication of this finding is that the innovation strategy of a
firm has to be carefully re-evaluated, both with respect to the level of R&D investment
and its response to the opponent’s capacity adjustments, once the competitor has won the
innovation race.
More technically, our analysis is based on Markov Perfect Equilibria in a dynamic
duopoly model. Initially, the two incumbent firms offer an established homogeneous prod-
uct. Both firms have the possibility to build up a firm-specific resource (referred to as
R&D knowledge stock) that is essential for product innovation. The possibility to invest
in production capacity and to launch the new product arises if a firm’s R&D project is
successfully completed where the exact time when the breakthrough occurs is unknown
(stochastic) to the firms. Each firm’s hazard rate of innovation is a function of both the
accumulated knowledge stock and its current investment in the R&D knowledge stock. At
an ex-ante unknown point in time, the range of products of one of the firms is enlarged by
introduction of a new product which is an (imperfect) substitute for the existing product
and is vertically and horizontally differentiated. When the first innovator introduces this
new product, a new submarket is created and the innovator can then start to invest in the
development of resources for production of the new product. The rival firm might enter
this new submarket later, once its own R&D project has been completed. Firms adjust
their production capacities for the product(s) through costly (dis)investments. Capaci-
ties cannot be (fully) transferred between the production of different products. A firm’s
objective is to maximize its expected total discounted profits by optimally investing in
production capacities for the (existing and new) products it offers and, before the new
product is introduced, by optimally investing in R&D knowledge stock.
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To capture the structural breaks in the industry dynamics that are triggered by the
(stochastic) endogenous creation of new submarkets by incumbents, a piecewise determin-
istic (also called multi-mode) differential game is employed. The introduction of the new
product by each of the incumbents corresponds to a transition between different modes of
the game. To characterize a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in this game of complex struc-
ture and high-dimensional state space, we rely on a numerical collocation approach using
sparse grid methods. Although sparse grid methods have been recently applied in dy-
namic macroeconomic models (e.g. Malin et al. (2011)), as a technical contribution our
paper illustrates the potential of such an approach for strategy dynamics, in particular for
analyzing optimal firm strategies in a dynamic industry model.
Intuitively, the interplay of three effects determine the characteristics of the equilibrium
feedback functions which describe the firms’ R&D strategies. First, the total production
capacity on the established market influences the price of the product on the new sub-
market negatively. This, in turn, reduces the incentives to enter that market. We label
this as the size effect (see also Dawid et al. (2013)). Second, the dynamics of the in-
vestments in R&D knowledge stock is strongly influenced by the pure knowledge effect
(see Doraszelski (2003)). R&D incentives are negatively influenced by the firm’s current
hazard rate because after its R&D project has been completed, the accumulated stock of
R&D knowledge becomes obsolete for the firm. In particular, the pure knowledge effect
explains why after a downward jump of R&D investment at the time of the creation of the
new submarket, it can be optimal for the firm to subsequently increase its R&D activity.
Third, sales in the new submarket have a negative effect on the price of the established
product. This is the well-known cannibalization effect which affects the incumbents’ profits
on that market negatively (e.g. Moorthy and Png (1992), Desai (2001), Yayla-Küllü et al.
(2013)). Hence, the cannibalization effect negatively influences the R&D incentive of an
incumbent and is stronger the larger the firm’s capacity on the established market. Note
that the size effect depends on both the firm’s own and the opponent’s capacity on the
established market. In contrast, the cannibalization effect only concerns the firm’s own
capacity. Hence, although prior to the creation of the new submarket the firm’s intensity
to invest in the R&D knowledge stock is negatively affected both by the own and the
competitor’s capacity, the effect of the own capacity on R&D incentives is stronger. This
explains why the incumbent with larger capacity on the established market invests less in
product innovation. The downward jump of the firm’s R&D investment at the time when
the new submarket is created by the competitor is driven by the fact that before this time
the firm expects to be the first innovator with positive probability, hence expects to obtain
high profits as the only supplier of the new product.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief overview of the related
literature. Then, Section 3 introduces the model and details its assumptions. Section 4 is
devoted to a characterization of the firms’ optimal investment strategies. Section 5 explores
how strategies to invest in R&D knowledge stock are affected by the (relative) firm size
on the established market before the new market emerges. Section 6 highlights that the
laggard’s equilibrium strategy of investing in R&D after the successful product innovation
of its competitor qualitatively differs from the optimal strategy during the innovation race.
A scenario in which the firms differ with respect to their investment costs on the established
market is considered in Section 7. We show that despite such a persistent structural
disadvantage, the less efficient firm might have a comparative advantage in the long run.
Section 8 analyzes how R&D incentives and innovation speed differ between duopoly and
monopoly. Section 9 concludes and discusses which testable empirical implications follow
from our analysis. The Appendix provides details about the derivation and numerical
4
calculation of the Markov Perfect Equilibria, confirms the robustness of our results with
respect to parameter variations and gives a formal treatment of the determination of the
socially optimal strategy.
2 Literature
Our paper is related to several important lines of research in the literature. First, on a gen-
eral level it contributes to recent research which focuses on dynamic models of firm strate-
gies under competitive interactions (e.g. Ghemawat and Cassiman (2007), Casadesus-
Masanell and Yoffie (2007), Sterman et al. (2007), Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat
(2006), and Adner and Zemsky (2006)).
More specifically, Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2007) consider a duopoly setup
in which an exogenously determined leader invests over time to obtain a resource, which
gives a competitive advantage. Once the leader has the resource, the follower can start
investing to obtain that resource as well in order to level the playing field on the mar-
ket. They characterize under which circumstances the follower has incentives to invest
and therefore catches up with the leader. Building on this, they determine the optimal
investment strategy of the leader in such a scenario as well as in one where the leader does
not have to fear that the follower catches up. In particular, the authors show that there
is a higher incentive to develop the resource in the latter case. Our setup is related to
that in Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2007) as we also consider the different phases of
duopoly competition before the first innovation, after the first innovation, and after both
firms have innovated. However, different from their paper, in our setting the first phase is
characterized by innovation competition such that innovation leadership is endogenously
determined. Furthermore, whereas in Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2007) the instan-
taneous profits for the two firms in the different phases of competition are constant and
given, we endogenize these profits as functions of both firms’ production capacities. This
allows us to study the relationship between incentives to invest in R&D and investments
in strengthening the competitive position on the existing markets.
Pacheco-de-Almeida (2010) studies an environment where a leader firm’s competitive
advantage gets eroded by imitation and innovation in a hypercompetitive environment.
He derives conditions under which the leader should optimally “self-displace” itself by
investing less in renewing its competitive advantage, thereby increasing the probability
of getting displaced by a rival. Similarly, we consider an incumbent leader that is cur-
rently more profitable due to an advantage in market share or in investment costs for
accumulating production resources and argue that it is rational for the leader to opt for
self-displacement. With respect to characterizing dynamic strategies, our approach differs
in that we characterize Markov Perfect Equilibria of an underlying dynamic game, whereas
in Pacheco-de-Almeida (2010) no dynamic strategic interaction between the competitors
is considered.
Like in Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2007) and Pacheco-de-Almeida (2010), our
work is also concerned with the impact of accumulation of asset stocks, time compression
diseconomies, and asset erosion (e.g. Dierickx and Cool (1989)) on a firm’s dynamic R&D
strategy and innovation timing. An important difference is that in these contributions the
firm exactly knows the level of accumulated effort needed to achieve the resource develop-
ment, whereas in our setting the time of the firms’ innovation breakthrough is stochastic.
Therefore, firms can only influence the distribution of innovation times, but cannot fully
determine them. In this respect our setup is related to Breton et al. (2006), who con-
sider a dynamic duopoly game and assume that firms invest in knowledge stocks, which
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subsequently determine the probability of successful R&D. However, while they consider
process (i.e. cost-reducing) R&D, we study product innovations and the associated sudden
change in market structure. Furthermore, our model also takes into account that resources
for production have to be accumulated over time.
Ofek and Sarvary (2003) is related to our setting by employing a dynamic game for
studying the incentives of incumbent firms to invest in R&D. However, they assume that
firm-specific hazard rates depend only on current investments, whereas we capture the
need to accumulate an R&D knowledge stock and resources for production. Additionally,
we take into account the linkage between the existing market and the new market and its
effect on the firms’ profits. Like us, Mitchell and Skrzypacz (2015) consider a model of
industry evolution with endogenous creation of submarkets by incumbents and entrants.
However, their analysis is on the industry level, whereas our focus is on optimal innovation
strategies at the firm level, as we study the incumbents’ optimal intertemporal investment
strategies.
The second line of related literature deals with disruptive innovations and also tries to
answer the question why leading incumbents are slower to enter newly created submar-
kets than their smaller rivals. Christensen (1997) argues that differences in the internal
resource allocation processes and dominant managerial logics of large and small firms re-
sult in the ’Innovator’s Dilemma’. This leads to the outcome that large incumbent firms
might fail to react appropriately to the emergence of new disruptive technologies or busi-
ness models. In an analytical model of Cournot competition with horizontal and vertical
differentiation, Adner and Zemsky (2005) characterize how the boundaries of technology
competition depend on various properties like rates of technological advance, the number
of firms which use the old and the new technology, relative market segment sizes, and the
ability of firms to price discriminate. In contrast to work on disruptive innovation, we do
not consider drastic or radical innovations as in our model existing and new market seg-
ments are coexisting. Moreover, we argue that the leader incumbent’s decision to enter the
new submarket late is perfectly consistent with the goal of long run profit maximization.
In a recent paper, Wu et al. (2014) provide an alternative view on disruptive innovations.
They argue that it might be preferable for incumbents to offer their new products in a
smaller niche (on a complement-preserving trajectory) in order to leverage their exist-
ing complementary assets rather than to compete head-to-head with their rivals (along a
complement-disrupting trajectory). While we share the view of Wu et al. (2014) that the
decision of big incumbents to retreat to a smaller niche might be optimal, our main line
of reasoning is that the accumulation of essential resources for production and innovation
takes time and is costly. Swinney et al. (2011) study how the timing of capacity invest-
ment differs between incumbent and new firms when they enter new markets. Like us,
they find an asymmetric equilibrium where a (smaller) start-up builds capacity early and
enters the new market first while a (larger) incumbent optimally enters later. In contrast
to their model, we consider the continuous accumulation of production capacities (and
R&D knowledge stocks) and capture the endogenous creation of submarkets. Schmidt
and Porteus (2000a,b) and Huang and Sosic (2010) study the incentives of an incumbent
and an entrant to enter a new market. Dawid et al. (2013) consider a setting with two
incumbents that can both enter a new market. In contrast to our paper, their models are
static and, hence, these papers do not contribute to the questions of optimal accumulation
of resources for production and innovation and the resulting optimal innovation timing.
From a technical perspective, our paper is further related to the literature on capital
accumulation games in industrial organization (e.g. Jun and Vives (2004), Lapham and
Ware (1994)), in which capacity investments of single-product firms engaged in oligopolis-
6
tic competition have been characterized both in the framework of open-loop and Markov
Perfect Equilibria. Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) introduce a capacity accumulation
game in discrete time to characterize an evolving industry structure and to explain the
persistence of differences in firm size (cf. also Doraszelski and Pakes (2007), Escobar
(2013)). Besanko et al. (2010) study capacity accumulation patterns in a discrete-time
dynamic duopoly game with strategic uncertainty (about the rival’s cost) and find that
the occurrence of preemption races (where excess capacity is built up) and capacity co-
ordination (where capacities are close to cartel levels) depend on the degree of product
differentiation, investment sunkness, and capacity depreciation. This literature, however,
has not dealt with capacity adjustment processes in cases where a firm’s product line con-
sists of more than one product. Furthermore, this literature does not deal with the firms’
incentive to change the size of their product range.
Our paper relates also to research on differential R&D games, for example Cellini and
Lambertini (2002, 2009), or Lambertini and Mantovani (2009). In contrast to us, they
focus either on product innovation or on process innovation of single-product firms, or on
the interaction between these two types of innovation. Hence, they do not study the issue
of incumbents who face the problem of launching new products and have to accumulate
resources for production and innovation over time.
3 The Model
We consider a dynamic duopoly in continuous time with evolving market structure. Ini-
tially, two incumbent firms A and B produce a homogeneous product called product 1.
We refer to product 1 as the established or ‘old’ product. Both firms invest in the accu-
mulation of an R&D knowledge stock which is essential to develop a new differentiated
product, called product 2. Let τA and τB be the stochastic completion times of the firms’
R&D projects. Once one of the firms has innovated, a new submarket can be created.2
At this stage only the innovator can sell both products 1 and 2, whereas the laggard is
selling the established product while simultaneously investing in R&D knowledge stock to
eventually enter the new submarket as well. Once both firms have innovated, products 1
and 2 are supplied by both firms. In the sequel, we refer to both firm A and B by subscript
f (f = A,B) but keep the distinction whenever it is necessary.
To enable production, firms A and B need production capacities, denoted byKif (t), i =
1, 2, f = A,B. In the stage prior to the creation of the new submarket, called mode m1,
both firms invest in their production capacity K1f (t) for product 1 and invest in the
accumulation of their firm-specific R&D knowledge stock KRf (t). In the stage after the
new submarket has been created, corresponding to mode m2 (mode m3) where firm A
(firm B) innovates first, the firm that has first completed the R&D project invests in
production capacity for both products. The laggard continues to invest in capacity for
product 1 and its R&D knowledge stock. In the last phase or mode m4, which emerges
after the innovation of the laggard, firms compete on both markets and (dis)invest in
both production capacities. Production capacities and R&D knowledge stocks accumulate
according to
K˙if (t) = Iif (t)− δiKif (t) i = 1, 2, R, f = A,B, (1)
where Iif (t) is the investment of firm f in stock Ki at time t. These standard dynamics
account for the fact that accumulation of resources for production and innovation take
2The submarket is actually created once the innovator invests in production capacity for the new product
and hence this product is produced and sold on the market.
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time, but also that asset erosion takes place where δi > 0, i = 1, 2 denote the (symmetric)
depreciation rates. With regard to the R&D knowledge stock, organizational forgetting
(see Doraszelski (2003) and references therein) is captured by δR > 0.
Concerning production resources, we allow the firms to intentionally disinvest, i.e.
Iif ∈ IR. With regard to the R&D knowledge stocks, we make the sensible assumption
that knowledge investments are non-negative, i.e. IRf ≥ 0. The firms cannot invest in
production capacity of the second product before the R&D project has been completed,
which implies that I2f (t) = 0 for all t < τf .
Furthermore, all stocks have to be non-negative:
Kif (t) ≥ 0 ∀t ≥ 0 i = 1, 2, R, f = A,B. (2)
The arrival of the innovation of firm f is determined by a firm’s hazard rate λf which
is a function of the current investment IRf (t) in the R&D knowledge stock as well as the
R&D knowledge stock KRf (t) itself. We employ an additive form of the hazard rate (see
Doraszelski (2003)), given by
λ(IRf (t),KRf (t)) = αIRf (t) + βKψRf (t), α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, ψ > 0, f = (A,B). (3)
The probability for a firm’s successful innovation is positively affected by its current level
of investment in resources for innovation and its accumulated knowledge through past R&D
activities. The chosen formulation of the hazard rate captures this property in the most
simple way. The parameters α and β determine, respectively, the marginal impact of the
current investment and the accumulated knowledge on the hazard rate. In what follows
we will focus on scenarios where ψ > 1, i.e. where the firm’s hazard rate is strictly convex
in its R&D knowledge stock. This is in line with evidence that points to the cumulative
nature of R&D activities (e.g. Dosi (1988)), and it implies that the effect of a marginal
increase of R&D knowledge grows with the current level of the R&D knowledge stock.
Formally, the changes between the modes of the game are described by a Markov
process m(t) on the state space M = {m1, ...,m4} where the transition rates are given by
lim
∆→0
1
∆Prob {m(t+ ∆) = mj | m(t) = mi} =

λ(IRA,KRA) (i, j) = (1, 2), (3, 4),
λ(IRB,KRB) (i, j) = (1, 3), (2, 4),
0 else.
(4)
This formulation embodies the idea that before the creation of the new submarket (i.e. in
mode m1) there are positive probabilities of transition either to mode m2 with firm A as
innovator or to mode m3 with firm B as innovator. From modes m2 or m3, the transition
has to switch to mode m4, where both firms offer both products. The expected time of
this final transition depends on the hazard rate of the innovation laggard. Once both firms
offer both products no more transitions are possible.
At any point in time t firms compete in quantities, where it is assumed that current
production capacities for the two products are always fully exploited. This assumption
is commonly made in the literature on capacity-constrained oligopoly competition (e.g.
Anand and Girotra (2007), Goyal and Netessine (2007) and Huisman and Kort (2015)).
For example, Goyal and Netessine (2007) argue that firms may find it difficult to produce
below capacity due to fixed costs associated with, for example, labor inputs, commitments
to other suppliers, or production ramp-up. Given this assumption, prices are given by the
linear inverse demand system (e.g. Lus and Muriel (2009)):
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p1(t) = 1− (K1A(t) +K1B(t))− η(K2A(t) +K2B(t)) (5)
p2(t) = 1 + θ − η(K1A(t) +K1B(t))− (K2A(t) +K2B(t)). (6)
In this setting, the parameter η (−1 < η < 1) determines the degree of horizontal
differentiation between the established and the new product. We restrict attention to
scenarios where the new product is a partial substitute of the established product, corre-
sponding to η > 0. Accordingly, a firm’s dynamic strategy of building up capacities for
the established product and the new product is inextricably linked through its impact on
the prices of the products on the two markets. The parameter θ determines the degree
of vertical differentiation and measures the difference in quality between the new product
and the established product. The assumption that product 2 is at least of the same quality
as product 1 translates into θ ≥ 0.
Investment costs are assumed to have the linear-quadratic form
Γif (Ii(t)) = µifIif (t) +
1
2γiIif (t)
2 i = 1, 2, R. (7)
This formulation captures time compression diseconomies for building up resources for
production and innovation. The parameter µif represents the unit price of capacity for
product i (i = 1, 2) or the unit price of the knowledge capital (i = R). The parameter
γi > 0 (i = 1, 2, R) is the adjustment cost parameter. In our default setting all cost
parameters are symmetric across firms and asymmetry between firms arises due to initial
resource heterogeneity. However, in order to be able to study the impact of structural
(dis-)advantages of a firm on a certain market we also allow investment costs to differ
between the firms. For simplicity, marginal production costs are normalized to zero.
Firms choose their investment strategies in order to maximize their expected infinite
horizon discounted profit stream. Formally, we have
Jf = IE
{∫∞
0 e
−rt [(1− (K1A +K1B)− η(K2A +K2B))K1f
+(1 + θ − η(K1A +K1B)− (K2A +K2B))K2f
−µ1fI1 − γ12 I21 − µ2fI2 − γ22 I22 − µRfIR − γR2 I2R
]
dt,
(8)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the mode dynamics. The first two lines
capture the instantaneous sales revenue for the established product and the new product.
The third line contains the current costs of investment in production capacity and R&D
knowledge stock. It should be noted that in modes where a firm has not introduced the
new product yet, both investment and production capacity for that product are zero, such
that the corresponding terms vanish in the instantaneous profit function.
This gives rise to a piecewise deterministic differential game with objective functions
(8), the state dynamics (1) and the mode dynamics (4). Since a firm can build up capacity
for the new product only after the new submarket has been created and it has added the
new product to its product line, this implies that the following constraints hold in the
different modes:
I2f (t) = 0, ∀t s.t. m(t) = m1, f = A,B
I2B(t) = 0, ∀t s.t. m(t) = m2,
I2A(t) = 0, ∀t s.t. m(t) = m3.
9
Non-negativity constraints for production capacities, the R&D knowledge stock, and the
investments in R&D knowledge stock have to be satisfied. To study how the anticipation
of the emergence of a new submarket impacts firms’ current investments in resources for
production and innovation, we assume that the game starts before the new submarket has
been created. That is, m(0) = m1 and the initial values of production capacities and the
R&D knowledge stock are given by K1f (0) = Kini1f , K2f (0) = 0, KRf (0) = KiniRf .
4 Dynamic Investment Strategies
In order to analyze optimal strategies for investing in resources for production and innova-
tion, we consider stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) of the game. A stationary
Markovian strategy of firm f is given by a triple (φ1f , φRf , φ2f ) such that each of the feed-
back strategies φif and φRf describe the optimal dynamic investment for accumulating
production capacity and R&D knowledge as a function of the states and the current mode
of the game. More precisely, each of these feedback strategies has the form φif : [0, 1]2 ×
[0, K¯R]2×[0, 1+θ]2×M 7→ IR for i ∈ {1, 2} and φRf : [0, 1]2×[0, K¯R]2×[0, 1+θ]2×M 7→ IR+0 .
The upper bound of the R&D knowledge stock KR is assumed to be sufficiently large to
ensure that the stable steady states characterized in the following analysis are interior. Al-
though we write the feedback strategies in this general form, clearly some arguments are
irrelevant in some modes. In particular, due to the investment constraints in the different
modes, φ2f = 0 has to hold in mode m1 since no investment in production capacity of the
new product is possible before the product innovation is successful. For the non-innovator
the same holds in mode m2 or m3. Furthermore, we have φRA = 0 (φRB = 0) in mode
m2 (m3) and φRf = 0, f = A,B, in m4 since no more innovations are possible. Similarly
K2f , f = A,B, is by assumption equal to zero in mode m1 and KRf is irrelevant in mode
m4. The same reasoning implies that also in modes m2 and m3 only four state variables
are relevant. To ease notation, in what follows we will drop all irrelevant arguments in
the corresponding modes. As a notational convention, the first and third argument in
the feedback functions of both firms always refer to stock variables of firm A, whereas
the second and fourth to stock variables of firm B. In accordance with the literature (see
Dockner et al. (2000)) we only consider non-anticipating strategies, i.e. strategies where
firms cannot condition their actions on realizations of the time of mode transitions which
lie in the future.
A Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the game is a profile of stationary Markovian strate-
gies, where each firm uses a strategy maximizing expected profit given the strategy of the
opponent. In order to characterize such equilibrium profiles, a set of Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equations has to be solved, containing one equation for each player in
each mode. The multi-mode structure of the game implies that the value functions in the
different modes are linked through terms in the HJB equations that capture the jumps in
the firms’ value at the times an innovation occurs. Using these equations we obtain the
following proposition, which is proved in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. The feedback strategies in a Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the game are
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given by
φ∗if (.,m) =
1
γh
(
∂Vf (·,m)
∂Kif
− µif
)
, i = 1, 2, f = A,B,m ∈ {m1, ..,m4} (9)
φ∗RA(.,m1) =
1
γR
(
∂VA(·,m1)
∂KRA
− µRA + α(VA(·,m2)− VA(·,m1))
)
(10)
φ∗RB(.,m1) =
1
γR
(
∂VB(·,m1)
∂KRB
− µRB + α(VB(·,m3)− VB(·,m1))
)
(11)
φ∗Rf (.,m) =
1
γR
(
∂Vf (·,m)
∂KRf
− µRf + α(Vf (·,m4)− Vf (·,m))
)
,
f = A,B,
m = m2,m3
,(12)
where Vf (K1A,K1B,KRA,KRB,K2A,K2B,m) denotes the value function of firm f = A,B
in mode m ∈M .
Investment in production capacity of the established product and the new product
is proportional to the difference between the marginal effect of an increase in capacity
on the firm’s value function and the unit price of capacity (see (9)). Concerning a firm’s
investment in R&D knowledge stock, an additional effect arises because such an investment
increases the hazard rate of making the transition to a different mode where the firm is
active on both markets. This mode transition induces a jump in the value function and
the corresponding effect is captured by the last terms in (10) to (12).
The main technical and computational challenge is to solve the underlying set of HJB
equations of our differential game with stochastically evolving market structure. Due to the
fact that the hazard rates are non-linear functions of the state variables, these equations,
apart from mode m4, do not allow for closed-form (polynomial) solutions. Hence, we rely
on numerical collocation methods for the computation of the value functions in the different
modes.3 Furthermore, the large dimension of the state space requires the application of
sparse grid methods in the collocation (see Maliar and Maliar (2014)). Details of the
method used in our analysis are given in Appendix B. For all results presented in the
following sections it has been checked that the transversality conditions are satisfied in all
modes.
In what follows, we present numerical results obtained by this approach for the baseline
parameter setting given in Table 1. The unit price of production capacity, µi, is normalized
to zero, but the values of the adjustment cost parameters, γi, are positive. To capture
the interplay between the markets, the degree of horizontal differentiation is assumed to
be η = 0.65. We deal with a scenario where the difference in qualities between the new
product and the old product is moderate, which is reflected by θ = 0.2. Depreciation
rate and interest rate are set to standard values. As discussed above, we assume that
the hazard rate is a strictly convex function of the firm’s R&D knowledge stock (ψ = 2).
The coefficients α and β of the hazard rate as well as the parameters µR, γR of the R&D
investment cost have been chosen such that expected innovation times in equilibrium are
about 1 year. This seems to be in accordance with product development cycles in certain
industries, like for instance the Laptop industry (see also Pacheco-de-Almeida 2010). In
Appendix C we provide an extensive robustness analysis in which we demonstrate that the
main qualitative findings presented in this paper continue to hold for a reasonable range
of parameter values around the default setting.
3See for example Vedenov and Miranda (2001) and Dawid et al. (2015, 2017) for more details on the
collocation method.
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Symbol Definition Constraint Baseline
α Effectiveness of current R&D ≥ 0 0.2
β Effectiveness of past R&D ≥ 0 0.2
ψ Marginal impact of past R&D ≥ 0 2
η Horizontal differentiation |η| < 1 0.65
θ Vertical differentiation ≥ 0 0.2
δ1, δ2 Depr. rate for capacities K1,K2 > 0 0.2
δR Organizational forgetting > 0 0.3
µ1, µ2 Unit price of prod. capacity i = 1, 2 ≥ 0 0
µR Unit price of knowledge capital ≥ 0 0.2
γ1 Adj. cost for product i = 1 > 0 3
γ2 Adj. cost for product i = 2 > 0 3
γR Adj. cost for knowledge capital > 0 0.1
r Interest rate 0 < r ≤ 1 0.04
Table 1: Baseline Parameter Setting of the Model
Before examining the properties of the firms’ optimal R&D strategies in the following
sections, we briefly illustrate the implications of differences in the initial capacity on the
firms’ dynamic investments in production capacities. The purpose is to show how the
dynamics of firm sales is affected by the order and timing of the product innovations by the
two firms. In Figure 1 we show the dynamics of production capacities in a situation where
firms are symmetric except for the initial size of the production capacity on the established
product market.4 Both firms start with zero R&D knowledge, firm A’s production capacity
for the established product corresponds to the steady state level in a standard one-product
capital accumulation game where firms do not account for the option to develop a new
product, and firm B starts with half of firm A’s production capacity. As discussed below,
it turns out that the expected innovation time of the smaller firm B is shorter than that of
its larger competitor A. Therefore, for the purpose of illustration it is assumed in Figure
1 that firm B enters the new market first. In panel (a) of Figure 1 it is assumed that
innovation times of the incumbents equal their expected values (see Section 8). The figure
highlights a strong path dependency on the established market: due to the innovation
process, firm B stays the smaller firm on that market for the entire time interval depicted
although structurally the two firms are completely symmetric. Furthermore, it can be
clearly seen that both firms reduce their capacities for the established product once the
new submarket emerges, where the effect is much stronger for the innovator. In panel
(b), later innovation times are assumed in order to show the full dynamics of the firms’
production capacities which might emerge in each mode. Comparing the two panels of
Figure 1 shows that the qualitative features of the firms’ dynamic investment strategies
do not depend on the actual times of the realizations of the innovations. Panel (b) also
illustrates that, since the two firms are structurally symmetric they end up with symmetric
capacities in the long run after both firms have entered the new submarket.
4Although, in general, we cannot expect uniqueness of Markov Perfect Equilibria of the considered
game, we have always found only a single MPE in our numerical explorations. To ensure robustness, we
have carried out the analysis for a wide range of initializations of the collocation algorithm without finding
other MPEs. All figures show the trajectories resulting from this single MPE.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium dynamics of production capacities for the established product and
the new product for asymmetric initial capacities on the established market. In the scenario
depicted the smaller firm B innovates first. In Panel (a) innovation times correspond to
their expected values, in panel (b) innovation times are sufficiently large such that the
(approximate) steady state in each mode is reached.
5 Firm Size and Innovation Timing
This paper argues that the observed pattern that large incumbent firms typically enter
newly emerging submarkets later than their smaller rivals is fully consistent with long run
profit maximization behavior. For this reason we study how an incumbent’s size on the
established market (in terms of production capacities) affects investment incentives and
the timing of innovation. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the hazard rate for the scenario
depicted in Figure 1. The initial difference in the incumbents’ production capacities on
the established market leads to a persistent difference in the firms’ hazard rates in mode
m1. As shown, firm B with a smaller capacity on the established market has a higher
hazard rate of innovation. The smaller incumbent has a higher incentive to innovate and
thus has a smaller expected innovation time than the larger incumbent A.
The intuition for the observation that the smaller firm has a larger incentive to innovate
is as follows. As discussed in the previous section and highlighted in (10) and (11), firms’
investment in R&D knowledge stock is mainly driven by two effects: first, the marginal
change in the value function of the current mode induced by an increase in the R&D
knowledge stock and, second, the jump in the value function caused by the innovation
breakthrough and the associated creation of a new submarket. The size of the firm’s
production capacity on the established market mainly affects the second of these two
effects. The reason is that the introduction of the new product in the new (but linked)
submarket results in a decrease of the price for the established product and the firm with
the larger capacity on the established market is more strongly affected by it. Hence, the
difference between the firm’s value function in the mode where the firm is the innovation
leader (i.e. m2 for firm A and m3 for firm B) and the value function in mode m1 is
decreasing in the firm’s production capacity on the established market.
Figure 3(a) shows the dependence of equilibrium investment in R&D knowledge stock
on the capacities on the established market.5 The figure reveals that the cannibalization
effect indeed is an important force shaping the influence of a firm’s engagement in the
5The range of capacities K1A,K1B considered in the figure covers the whole interval between 0 and the
monopoly output level on the established market.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium dynamics of the hazard rates for asymmetric initial production
capacities on the established market. It is assumed that the smaller firm B innovates first.
established product market on a firm’s incentive to invest in R&D knowledge stock. Fur-
thermore, the incentive to invest in R&D knowledge stock is influenced by a size effect.
As the figure highlights, a firm’s investment in R&D knowledge stock is also negatively
affected by the competitor’s size on the established market (although this dependence is
weaker). The mechanism driving this relation is that a larger production capacity on the
established market induces a smaller price for the new product after its introduction. This
reduces the profitability of the new product and thereby the incentive to speed up the
introduction of the new product. Note that, in contrast to the cannibalization effect, for
the size effect it is irrelevant whether the expansion of the capacity on the established
market is due to an increase of the competitor’s production capacity or the firm’s own
production capacity. Overall, the capacities of both firms on the established market neg-
atively influence the firm’s incentive to invest in R&D knowledge stock, but the effect of
the firm’s own capacity is much stronger. Taken together, the size and the cannibalization
effect explain why the larger firm has a lower incentive to invest in R&D knowledge stock
and, consequently, has a larger expected innovation time.
Concerning the effect of the competitor’s capacity, K1B, on a firm’s investment in R&D
knowledge stock, IRA, there is also an additional strategic R&D effect. This effect arises
since the competitor’s R&D investment, IRB, is negatively influenced by its production
capacity K1B on the established market. In turn, a lower level of investments IRB over
time induces a reduction in the competitor’s R&D knowledge stock KRB. Panel (b) of
Figure 3 shows that there is a negative relationship between the R&D knowledge stock of
firm B and firm A’s investment in its R&D knowledge stock. Taken together, the strategic
effect of an increase of the competitor’s production capacity K1B on firm A’s investment
in R&D knowledge stock is positive. However, as Figure 3(a) demonstrates, this strategic
effect is dominated by the direct effect (discussed above) of an increase of the competitor’s
capacity on a firm’s investment in R&D knowledge stock.
Figure 3(b) shows that besides the negative relation between the competitor’s R&D
knowledge stock, KRB, and firm A’s investment in R&D, IRA, firm A’s own R&D knowl-
edge stock, KRA, negatively influences the firm’s own level of investment in R&D knowl-
edge stock as well (in large parts of the state space). The intuition for both of these
negative relationships is that larger R&D knowledge stocks reduce the expected duration
of mode m1. The transition to a different mode either strongly reduces (in case the com-
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Figure 3: Investment in knowledge stock of firm A depending on production capacities on
the established market (a) and R&D knowledge stocks of the two firms (b). The values of
the arguments of the feedback functions not varied are fixed at the steady state levels in
mode m1.
petitor is the innovator) or completely eliminates (if firm A itself is the innovator) the
value of the firm’s R&D knowledge stock. Doraszelski (2003) identifies a similar effect in a
patent race setting and denotes it as the ’pure knowledge effect’. For small values of KRA
the convexity of the hazard rate with respect to a firm’s own R&D knowledge stock is the
dominant force inducing a positive relationship between KRA and IRA.
6 Impact of Competitor’s Innovation on R&D Strategy
The creation of the new submarket by a competitor has substantial implications for the
optimal dynamic innovation strategy of the laggard. Figure 2(a) demonstrates that the
hazard rate of firm A exhibits a downward jump at t = τB when the competitor’s inno-
vation project is successful and the new product is introduced to the submarket. This
discontinuity is followed by a smooth decreasing pattern. A direct implication of this
observation is that the expected waiting time until firm A’s project is successfully fin-
ished exhibits an upward jump after the opponent’s innovation and then actually keeps
increasing.6
The expected value of introducing the new product decreases considerably at the time
the competitor creates the new submarket. This is due to the fact that at this point the
possibility to become temporarily the sole supplier of the new product, which is associated
with a high profit, vanishes. For this reason, firm A’s investments in R&D knowledge stock
drops at t = τB and so does the hazard rate. The reduction in the level of investments in
R&D induces firm A’s R&D knowledge stock to decrease over time. Taking into account
the pure knowledge effect, this decrease in R&D knowledge stock has a positive impact on
the level of firm A’s R&D investments. Figure 2(b) demonstrates that this effect results
in an increasing pattern of IRA in mode m3 even though the quick build-up of capacity for
the new product by firm B further reduces the attractiveness of the innovation for firm A.
6With respect to this observation it should be noted that technological spillovers or imitation effects
are not captured by our model. Such effects might make it easier for the laggard to develop the new
product after the innovation leader has introduced it to the market. Here we focus strictly on the strategic
implications of the opponent’s product innovation.
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Figure 4: Investment in R&D knowledge of firm A depending on capacities on the estab-
lished market of firm B before (solid line) and after (dashed line) firm B has innovated.
The discussion above highlights that the laggard’s level of investment in R&D knowl-
edge stock differs between modes m1 and m3. However, there are also qualitative changes
in the properties of the innovation strategy. In particular, the transition from mode m1 to
m3 implies that the sign of the relationship between investment in R&D knowledge stock
and the opponent’s production capacity for the established market changes (see Figure 4).
In mode m1, an increase in incumbent B’s production capacity K1B decreases firm A’s
incentive to invest in R&D (bold line), whereas in mode m3 it implies an increase in firm
A’s R&D activities (dashed line). The reason for this qualitative change is that once firm
B is active on the new submarket, an increase of its production capacity on the established
market induces a reduction of firm B’s future investment on the new market. This, in turn,
makes the new submarket more attractive for firm A and, therefore, results in an increase
of firm A’s investment in R&D knowledge stock. Although this effect is already present
in mode m1, there the effect is weighted with the probability that the opponent wins the
race and is discounted according to the expected innovation time. Hence, in mode m1 this
effect is dominated by the size effect and we observe the decreasing pattern as discussed
above.
From a managerial perspective the main insight from this section is that it highlights
how to adjust the innovation strategy once a competitor has successfully created a new
submarket.
7 Competitive Disadvantage as a Basis for Innovation Lead-
ership
Our analysis so far has assumed that the two competitors (only) possess different initial
production capacities on the established market. In this context we have been studying
the strategic implications of transitory differences for the R&D strategies of otherwise
structurally identical firms. This section turns to the case where firms differ with respect to
their competitiveness on the established market. In particular, we impose that investment
costs of firm B on the established market are higher than that of firm A.7
7In the following numerical explorations we adjust our baseline parameter setting given in Table 1 by
increasing the adjustment cost parameter of firm B on the established market to γ1B = 9, but keep firm
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Figure 5: Hazard rates (a) and equilibrium dynamics of production capacities (b) in a
scenario with asymmetric adjustment costs on the established market (γ1A = 3, γ1B = 9).
The dynamics emerging in equilibrium in such a setting is depicted in Figure 5. Like in
Figure 1, initial R&D knowledge stocks of both firms are assumed to be zero. The initial
production capacities on the established market correspond to the steady state values of
this game without product innovation option. Due to its competitive disadvantage with
respect to investment costs, the initial production capacity of firm B on the established
market is, therefore, lower than firm A’s capacity. The figure highlights two important
implications of this structural asymmetry between firms. First, panel (a) reveals that
throughout mode m1 firm B has a larger hazard rate than firm A. This implies that
firm B has a smaller expected innovation time than firm A and a larger probability of
winning the innovation race. Second, under the assumption that firm B innovates first, it
has a strictly smaller production capacity on the established market, but a strictly larger
production capacity on the new submarket throughout all modes where these markets
exist (see panel (b)). Consequently, the disadvantage of higher investment costs on the
established market acts as a commitment device for firm B to be more aggressive during
the innovation race and also to be a tougher competitor on the new submarket. Innovation
leadership then follows from the negative relationship between the firm’s own capacity on
the established market and its incentive to invest in R&D knowledge stock, as discussed
in Section 5.
The previous discussion shows that the disadvantage of firm B with respect to invest-
ment costs on the established market has two counteracting implications for the firm’s
profit. The direct effect is that the profit of firm B on the established market is nega-
tively affected by its larger capital adjustment costs. The indirect effect is that firm A
invests less in its R&D knowledge stock because firm A takes into account that firm B
has a stronger incentive to invest in R&D. This raises firm B’s profit. The second effect
becomes more important if the expected time until the creation of the new submarket is
shorter. In the framework of our model this aspect is closely related to the parameter α,
which measures the impact of R&D investment on the breakthrough probability. Figure
6 illustrates that, for sufficiently large values of α, the firm with a structural disadvantage
on the established market can indeed have a larger expected discounted payoff than its
more efficient competitor.8
A’s adjustment cost parameter at γ1A = 3.
8In order to isolate the effect of an asymmetry in capacity adjustment costs (represented by γ1f ) on the
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Figure 6: Difference in the value functions of firms A and B for different values of the
parameter α and symmetric initial conditions.
8 Competition and Speed of Innovation
Our discussion in sections 5 and 6 has highlighted that each firm can induce a downward
jump in the R&D activities of its opponent by launching the new product and, even
before that, can reduce the competitor’s R&D investments by increasing its own knowledge
stock. This implies that in the duopoly setting competition induces additional incentives to
undertake R&D investment.9 Hence, from a managerial perspective, the question arises,
how R&D investments should be adjusted to the intensity of competition. To address
this issue, in Figure 7 we compare the optimal R&D strategies of firm A in our standard
duopoly setting with the scenario in which it is a monopolist.10 The figure clearly shows
that, regardless of the production capacity on the established market and the level of firm
A’s knowledge stock, it always invests more in R&D if no competitor is on the market.
The main driving force of this finding is that in a monopoly the innovator does not need
to reckon with later entry of the competitor into the new submarket, so that the expected
intertemporal rent is larger than in the duopoly. Put more formally, whereas in duopoly
the value function of the innovator will eventually exhibit a downward jump when the
other firm also launches the new product, under monopoly the innovator can extract the
monopoly rent for the new product indefinitely.
Although the incentives to invest in R&D for the individual firm are larger in a
monopoly market compared to duopoly, Figure 8 shows that nevertheless the speed of
innovation is faster in duopoly.11 Despite the lower hazard rate for each individual firm,
value functions of firms A and B, the difference in value functions in Figure 6 is calculated for symmetric
initial conditions Kini1A = Kini1B = 0.353. This value corresponds to the steady-state capacity of firm A in
the game without innovation option.
9In the literature this known as the ’Arrow replacement effect’ (Arrow (1962)).
10More formally, we consider the dynamic optimization problem of firm A if firm B is absent from the
established market and also cannot innovate, see Dawid et al. (2015) for a formal definition of the monopoly
problem.
11To make the monopoly scenario comparable to the duopoly we assume that the initial production
capacity of the monopolist on the established market is given by the sum of the initial production capacities
by the two firms in the duopoly scenario. The expected values in this figure have been calculated for
varying degrees of horizontal differentiation using Monte Carlo simulation of the dynamics emerging under
the feedback strategies numerically determined by collocation methods for the different scenarios and our
baseline parameter setting provided in Table 1.
18
AK1
RAI
RAK
Figure 7: R&D investment of firm A as a monopolist (green) vs. a duopolist with the
competitor’s state variables being equal to the steady state of mode m1 (blue).
the expected time until the creation of the new submarket is lower in duopoly, because
both competitors are working independently to achieve the innovation breakthrough.
In Figure 8 we also compare the expected innovation times under the two considered
market structures with the benchmark of the expected innovation time under a strategy
profile that is optimal from a social planner perspective.12 It becomes clear that although
competition speeds up innovation relative to a monopoly scenario, from a social planner
perspective even faster innovation would be desirable. Intuitively, this is due to the fact
that from the perspective of consumers, the creation of the new submarket generates a
surplus which is not taken into account by the firms. Firms are not able to fully appropriate
the returns of their investments in R&D knowledge stock. Hence, expected innovation time
is higher than in the social optimum.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze which effects drive the incentives of incumbents to invest in the
development of a resource - an R&D knowledge stock - which enhances the likelihood
that a product innovation can be introduced to a new submarket. Our dynamic setting
particularly emphasizes the interplay between the incumbents’ established product market
and the new submarket by taking into account that the new product is a partial substitute
for the established product. It also explicitly factors in that the adjustment of resources
for production are costly and take time.
Our setting provides several important managerial insights about the optimal dynamic
innovation strategies of incumbent firms. First, with regard to the empirically observed
pattern that larger incumbents are often late to enter emerging new submarkets, we find
that it is in fact the optimal strategy for an incumbent with a large production capacity
on the established product to invest less in resources for the development of the new
product. This result contrasts with earlier explanations that emphasize the benefits of
an "eat your own lunch before someone else does" approach. It is, however, perfectly in
line with more recent work which argues that leader firms may not always find it optimal
to cannibalize their existing advantage (e.g. Pacheco-de-Almeida 2010). In other words,
12A formal definition of the social planner problem is given in Appendix D.
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Figure 8: Expected time of the first innovation for different degrees of horizontal dif-
ferentiation for duopoly (red), monopoly (blue), and the social planner problem (black).
our findings confirm that a larger incumbent might rationally accept a higher probability
of being replaced by its smaller competitor which becomes the leader in the created new
submarket. Second, we show that it is optimal for an incumbent to reduce its investment
in resources for product innovation once the opponent has successfully launched its new
product in the submarket. We further demonstrate that the optimal investment strategy
to develop resources for product innovation differs qualitatively in the periods before the
opponent’s product innovation and after the opponent has successfully entered the new
submarket. Our third finding addresses the impact of a firm’s structural disadvantage, that
is captured by higher costs of adjusting production capacity for the established product, on
the firm’s incentive to invest in R&D knowledge. What we find is that such a competitive
disadvantage can actually turn out to be beneficial in the innovation race in the long run as
it acts as a commitment device for the disadvantaged firm to invest more aggressively in the
development of resources that are essential for a product innovation. We identify scenarios
where this effect can be so substantial that despite the higher capacity adjustment costs
on the established market, the cost follower can end up with a higher overall expected
discounted profit than the more efficient cost leader.
From a normative point of view, these insights are important to benchmark optimal in-
novation strategies of established firms that compete in product R&D in oligopoly markets
and face the problem of how to determine the optimal investment strategy in resources for
established and newly developed products in their product lines. From a policy perspec-
tive, our analysis shows that competition between two incumbent firms reduces the time
until a new product is introduced and brings it closer to the socially optimal level. Further-
more, our results might provide a theoretical basis for empirical studies that analyze the
effect of the (relative) market share of firms on established markets on the (relative) level
of investment in product innovation, or the effect of new product launches by opponents
on a firm’s investment in product innovation.
The analysis in this paper is restricted to scenarios where the new product launched by
incumbent firms in a newly created submarket is a (partial) substitute of the incumbents’
established product. Although in most industries this seems to be the more relevant case,
our model can also be employed to study the properties of the optimal intertemporal
innovation strategies if incumbents invest in the development of new products which are
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complements of their current product. Our findings for the case of complementary products
indicate that the qualitative results about the monotonicity of the investment in R&D
knowledge stock with respect to production capacities for the established product of a
firm and its competitor are reversed. However, similar to the substitutes case considered
in this paper, the creation of the new submarket by a competitor induces a downward jump
in the firm’s innovation activities if the new product is a complement to the established
product.
A limitation we share with most of the literature on innovation incentives under
oligopolistic competition is that firms do not face any financial constraints. As a con-
sequence, firms are always able to fully implement their planned investment strategies.
However, a rich empirical literature indicates that many firms encounter difficulties in ob-
taining external funding for investments in R&D, and, therefore, have to rely on internal
sources for financing their R&D activities. This opens up an additional channel which
influences the interaction between a firm’s accumulated profits resulting from established
products and a firm’s incentive to invest in product innovation. Examining the impact of
financial constraints and internal funding of R&D activities on the firm’s optimal dynamic
innovation strategy is a challenging avenue for future research.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Standard theory for piecewise deterministic games establishes that in each mode the value
function of each firm in a Markov Perfect Equilibrium is characterized by a Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. In particular we obtain the following HJB equations in
the different modes (see Dockner et al. (2000)):
Mode m1: the HJB equations of both firms are symmetric and are given by
r Vf (K1f ,KRf ,K1(−f),KR(−f),m1)
= max
I1f ,IRf
[
(1− (K1A +K1B))K1f − µ1fI1f − γ12 I
2
1f − µRfIRf −
γR
2 I
2
Rf
+∂Vf (·,m1)
∂K1f
(I1f − δK1f ) +
∂Vf,(m1)
∂KRf
(IRf − δRKRf )
+∂Vf (·,m1)
∂K1(−f)
(φ1(−f) − δK1(−f)) +
∂Vf,(m1)
∂KR(−f)
(φR(−f) − δRKR(−f))
+(αIRf + βKψRf ) (Vf (·,m2)− Vf (·,m1))
+(αφR(−f) + βKψR(−f)) (Vf (·,m3)− Vf (·,m1))
]
. (13)
The last two terms on the right hand side of the HJB-equation have to be added to
capture the effect of the future jump either to mode m2 or mode m3 on the value function
in mode m1. The right hand side (RHS) of equation (13) is strictly concave in (I1f , IRf ).
Consequently, the first order conditions for the maximization of the RHS are necessary
and sufficient and yield expressions (9), (10) and (11) for I1f and IRf .
Mode m2: in modes m2 (and m3) the HJB equations of the innovator and the laggard
differ substantially. In mode m2, the HJB equation of the innovator firm A reads
r VA(K1A,K2A,K1B,KRB,m2)
= max
I1A,I2A
[
(1− (K1A +K1B)− ηK2A)K1A − µ1AI1A − γ2 I
2
1A
+(1 + θ −K2A − η(K1A +K1B))K2A − µ2AI2A − γ2 I
2
2A
+∂VA(·,m2)
∂K1A
(I1A − δK1A) + ∂VA(·,m2)
∂K1B
(φ1B − δK1B)
+∂VA(·,m2)
∂K2A
(I2A − δK2A) + ∂VA(·,m2)
∂KRB
(φRB − δRKRB)
+(αφRB + βKψRB)(VA(·,m4)− VA(·,m2))
]
. (14)
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For the laggard firm B we obtain
r VB(K1A,K2A,K1B,KRB,m2)
= max
I1B ,IRB
[
K1B(1− (K1A(t) +K1B)− ηK2A)− µ1BI1B − 12γ1I
2
1B − µRBIRB
−12γRI
2
RB +
∂VB(·,m2)
∂K1B
(I1B − δ1K1B) + ∂VB(·,m2)
∂KRB
(IRB − δRKRB)
+∂VB(·,m2)
∂K1A
(φ1A − δ1K1A) + ∂VB(·,m2)
∂K2A
(φ2A − δ2K2A)
+(αIRB + βKψRB)(VB(·,m4)− VB(·,m2))
]
. (15)
In this mode, the last term captures the effect of the future jump to mode m4 on the
current value function.
Like in mode m1, the derivation of the expressions of the investment functions (9) and
(12) by the first order conditions is straightforward.
Symmetric equations are obtained for mode m3, where firm B is the innovator and
firm A is the laggard.
Mode m4: in this mode the HJB equations are again symmetric across firms and read
r Vf (K1f ,K(2f),K1(−f),K2(−f),m4)
= max
I1f ,I2f
[
K1f (1− (K1A +K1B)− η(K2A +K2B))− µ1fI1f − 12γ1I
2
1f
+K2f (1 + θ − η(K1A +K1B)− (K2A(t) +K2B))− µ2fI2f − 12γ2I
2
2f
+∂Vf (·,m4)
∂K1f
(I1f − δ1K1f ) + ∂Vf (·,m4)
∂K2f
(I2f − δ2K2f )
+∂Vf (·,m4)
∂K1(−f)
(φ1(−f) − δ1K1(−f)) +
∂Vf (·,m4)
∂K2(−f)
(φ2(−f) − δ2K2(−f))
]
(16)
By the strict concavity of the RHS in (I1f , I2f ), the first order conditions are necessary
and sufficient and again yield the expressions (9) for the investment functions.
Appendix B: Numerical Solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equa-
tions
In mode m4, the game is a standard symmetric linear quadratic capital accumulation
problem. Hence, the firms’ value functions and also the HJB equations are symmetric and
it is sufficient to solve for one value function. To this end, one postulates a quadratic form
of the value function and inserts the resulting terms for the value function, its derivative
and the induced feedback strategies into the HJB equation. Applying then the method
of equating the coefficients of all orders of the state variables on both sides of the HJB
equation yields a system of 14 quadratic algebraic equations. The system can be solved
numerically by equation solvers to determine the 14 coefficients of the value function of
the two firms for each constellation of parameters.
Since they have been derived from quadratic value functions, the above investment
functions are linear on the state space (K1A,K2A,K1B,K2B). Hence, the state dynamics is
linear as well. In addition, one checks the transversality conditions lim
t→+∞e
−rtVA(·,m4)(t) =
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0 and lim
t→+∞e
−rtVB(·,m4)(t) = 0 by verifying that the trajectories induced by the invest-
ment functions are non-explosive. To that end, it is sufficient to check that the four
eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the corresponding dynamical system are negative.
In mode m1, the first step of the numerical scheme is the generation of a set of Cheby-
chev nodes for each dimension (respectively n1f , nRf , n1(−f), nR(−f) nodes in the consid-
ered state space) and a set of base-functions chosen as multi-variate Chebychev polyno-
mials. The idea of the collocation method is to calculate an approximation of the value
function by determining a weighted sum of the base functions such that the HJB equa-
tions are (approximately) satisfied on the set of nodes (see Dawid et al. (2017) for a more
detailed description). In the standard approach the set of multivariate base function and
the nodes are given by the tensor product of the uni-variate or one-dimensional Chebychev
bases. However, due to the dimension of the state space in our problem this approach has
proven ineffective with respect to computational effort and convergence properties of the
collocation scheme.
Hence, our analysis relies on Smolyak collocation, which is a sparse grid method used
to approximate solutions to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations for large scale
dynamic economic systems subject to the curse of dimensionality. The method consists
of selecting collocation nodes and associated polynomials by a non-tensor product rule
that guarantees accuracy in spite of considering only a small subset of nodes and base
functions resulting from the tensor product (see e.g. Maliar and Maliar (2014), Judd et al.
(2014) and Malin et al. (2011) for a presentation of the Smolyak collocation method). The
cardinality of the Smolyak grid is a polynomial function of the number of nodes in each
dimension, compared to the exponential function that is called for by the tensor product.
For example, for 5 nodes on each dimension and precision degree 5, the cardinality of the
Smolyak grid is 41. For 9 nodes and precision degree 3, the cardinality of the Smolyak
grid is 137. The traditional tensor product rules would have left us, respectively, with 625
and 6561 nodes.
In our numerical analysis Smolyak collocation has proven efficient and computationally
feasible for the entire range of considered parameter constellations. Accuracy of the nu-
merical approximations has been checked by considering the maximal (absolute) deviation
of the right and the left hand side of the HJB equations (relative to the value function) on
the entire state space. For the numerical results reported in this paper this error is always
below 5 ∗ 10−4.
Appendix C: Robustness
In this Appendix we identify intervals around the default values of the model parameters for
which all the qualitative properties of the R&D investment functions identified in Sections
5 to 7 hold. In order to carry out these robustness tests, each considered parameter has
been varied in the given interval and the changes in the value functions corresponding to
these parameter variations have been calculated using homotopy methods. The analysis
is based on the consideration of the properties of the MPE feedback functions associated
with these value functions at the steady states in the corresponding modes. In Table 2 we
give a verbal and formal description of the properties that we have checked. To account
for potential numerical errors stemming from our method a margin of 5 · 10−4 has been
used to check for the signs of the involved expressions.
The following Table 3 gives the intervals of the key model parameters for which it has
been checked that all the key properties listed in Table 2 hold. Even outside these ranges
most properties seem very robust. The main reasons that the whole list of properties could
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Sub- Mode Description Formal Criterium
section
5 m1 R&D investment decreases w.r.t. ∂φRA(.;m1)∂K1A < −5.10−4
own old market capacity
5 m1 R&D investment decreases w.r.t. ∂φRA(.;m1)∂K1B < −5.10−4
competitor’s old market capacity
5 m1 negative effect of own old market capacity |∂φRA(.;m1)∂K1A |/|
∂φRA(.;m1)
∂K1B
|
on R&D is stronger than that of competitor’s > 1 + 5.10−4
capacity (⇒ larger firm invests less in R&D)
6 m3 R&D investment increases w.r.t. ∂φRA(.;m3)∂K1B > 5.10
−4
competitor’s old market capacity after
opponent’s innovation
6 m1, m3 R&D investment exhibits a downward jump φRA(.;m1) > φRA(.;m3)
when competitor innovates
Table 2: Qualitative properties checked in the robustness analysis.
Symbol Definition Baseline Robust interval
α Effectiveness of current R&D 0.2 [0.01, 0.29]
β Effectiveness of knowledge stock 0.2 [0.01, 0.39]
η Horizontal differentiation 0.65 [0.09, 0.77]
θ Vertical differentiation 0.2 [0.16, 0.32]
µR Unit costs of knowledge cap. 0.2 [0.06, 0.23]
γ1 Adjustment cost for prod. 1 3 [1.16, 4.38]
γ2 Adjustment cost for prod. 2 3 [0.34, 4.87]
γR Adjustment cost for knowledge cap. 0.1 [0.06, 0.48]
Table 3: Range of parameter values where all qualitative properties listed in Table 2 are
satsified.
not be verified outside the given intervals is that either the slope of the R&D investment of
firm B with respect to K1A after the opponent’s innovation (i.e. in mode m3) is no longer
positive but becomes slightly negative or that due to numerical issues the homotopy could
not be extended beyond the considered parameter interval.
Appendix D: The Social Planner Problem
To define the social planner problem we note that the linear inverse demand system (5),(6)
can be derived from the utility maximization of a representative consumer with a quadratic
utility function of the form
U(K1A,K1B,K2A,K2B) = (K1A +K1A)− 12(K1A +K1B)2 − η(K1A +K1B)(K2A +K2B)
+(1 + θ)(K2A +K2A)− 12(K2A +K2A)2.
In mode m2 (m3) the capacity K2B (K2A) has to be zero and for mode m1, both K2A and
K2B are zero. Taking into account that production costs have been normalized to zero
and assuming the same discount rate as in the firms’ problem we can therefore write the
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welfare function for an arbitrary profile of investment functions of the two firms as
W =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
U(K1A,K1B,K2A,K2B)− µ1I1A − γ1A2 I
2
1A
−µ2I2A − γ2A2 I
2
2A − µRIRA −
γRA
2 I
2
RA − µ1I1B −
γ1B
2 I
2
1B
−µ2I2B − γ2B2 I
2
2B − µRBIRB −
γR
2 I
2
RB
]
dt,
The social planner problem is to choose (I1f , I2f , Irf ), f = A,B in order to maximize
expected welfare (IEW ) subject to the state dynamics (1), the mode dynamics (4), as
well as the state constraint (2) and the control constraints associated with the different
modes. The expected innovation time under the social planner solution is then given by
τSP = IE min[τSPA , τSPB ], where τSPf is the innovation time of firm f if it invests according
to the strategy solving the social planner problem.
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